Demand uncertainty, endogenous timing and costly waiting : jumping the gun in competitive markets

demand;uncertainty;costs;general equilibrium

Enabling Personalized Composition and Adaptive Provisioning of Web Services

The proliferation of interconnected computing devices is fostering the emergence of environments where Web services made available to mobile users are a commodity. Unfortunately, inherent limitations of mobile devices still hinder the seamless access to Web services, and their use in supporting complex user activities. In this paper, we describe the design and implementation of a distributed, adaptive, and context-aware framework for personalized service composition and provisioning adapted to mobile users. Users specify their preferences by annotating existing process templates, leading to personalized service-based processes. To cater for the possibility of low bandwidth communication channels and frequent disconnections, an execution model is proposed whereby the responsibility of orchestrating personalized processes is spread across the participating services and user agents. In addition, the execution model is adaptive in the sense that the runtime environment is able to detect exceptions and react to them according to a set of rules

Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?

We determine the endogenous order of moves in a mixed pricesetting duopoly. In contrast to the existing literature on mixed oligopolies we establish the payo equivalence of the games with an exogenously given order of moves if the most plausible equilibrium is realized in the market. Hence, in this case it does not matter whether one becomes a leader or a follower. We also establish that replacing a private firm by a public firm in the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth game with capacity constraints increases social welfare and that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists

Strategically Equivalent Contests

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest, we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research

The all-pay-auction with complete information

In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium